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Abstract
When observing the actions of others, humans
make inferences about why they acted as they
did, and what this implies about the world; hu-
mans also use the fact that their actions will be
interpreted in this manner, allowing them to act in-
formatively and thereby communicate efficiently
with others. Although learning algorithms have
recently achieved superhuman performance in a
number of two-player, zero-sum games, scalable
multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms
that can discover effective strategies and conven-
tions in complex, partially observable settings
have proven elusive. We present the Bayesian
action decoder (BAD), a new multi-agent learn-
ing method that uses an approximate Bayesian
update to obtain a public belief that conditions on
the actions taken by all agents in the environment.
BAD introduces a new Markov decision process,
the public belief MDP, in which the action space
consists of all deterministic partial policies, and
exploits the fact that an agent acting only on this
public belief state can still learn to use its private
information if the action space is augmented to
be over all partial policies mapping private infor-
mation into environment actions. The Bayesian
update is closely related to the theory of mind
reasoning that humans carry out when observ-
ing others’ actions. We first validate BAD on a
proof-of-principle two-step matrix game, where
it outperforms policy gradient methods; we then
evaluate BAD on the challenging, cooperative
partial-information card game Hanabi, where, in
the two-player setting, it surpasses all previously
published learning and hand-coded approaches,
establishing a new state of the art.
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1. Introduction
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL), agents must
learn to act in an environment that contains multiple learn-
ing agents, often under partial observability (Littman, 1994).
In recent years, a variety of deep RL methods have been
adapted to this setting (Foerster et al., 2016a; Lowe et al.,
2017; Perolat et al., 2017; Jaderberg et al., 2018). In the par-
ticular case of cooperative, partially observable multi-agent
settings, a key challenge is to discover communication proto-
cols while simultaneously learning policies. Such protocols
are essential for many real-world tasks where agents must
interact and communicate seamlessly with other agents.
State-of-the-art deep RL methods for learning communica-
tion protocols mostly use backpropagation across a com-
munication channel (Sukhbaatar et al., 2016; Foerster et al.,
2016a). This approach has two limitations. First, it can only
be applied to cheap-talk channels in which the communi-
cation action has no effect on the environment. Second, it
misses the conceptual connection between communication
and reasoning over the beliefs of others, which is known to
be important to how humans learn to communicate (Grice,
1975; Frank & Goodman, 2012).
A well-known domain that highlights these challenges is
Hanabi, a popular, fully cooperative card game of incom-
plete information that is difficult even for humans (Hanabi
won the Spiel des Jahres award in 2013). A distinguishing
feature of the game is that players see everyone’s hands but
their own and must find effective conventions for commu-
nication to succeed. Since there is no cheap-talk channel,
most recent methods for emergent communication are inap-
plicable, necessitating a novel approach. Because of these
unique features, Hanabi has recently been proposed as a
new benchmark for multi-agent learning (?).
The goal in Hanabi is to play a legal sequence of cards and,
to aid this process, players are allowed to give each other
hints indicating which cards are of a specific rank or colour.
These hints have two levels of semantics. The first level is
the surface-level content of the hint, which is grounded in
the properties of the cards that they describe. This level of
semantics is independent of any possible intent of the agent
in providing the hint, and would be equally meaningful if
provided by a random agent. For example, knowing which
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Figure 1: a) In an MDP the action u is sampled from a policy pi that conditions on the state features (here separated into f pub
and fa). The next state is sampled from P (s′|s, u). b) In a PuB-MDP, public features f pub generated by the environment and
the public belief together constitute the Markov state sBAD. The ‘action’ sampled by the BAD agent is in fact a deterministic
partial policy ∆pi ∼ piBAD( ∆pi|sBAD) that maps from private observations fa to actions. Only the acting agent observes fa and
deterministically computes u = ∆pi(fa). u is provided to the environment, which transitions to state s′ and produces the new
observation f pub
′
. BAD then uses the public belief update to compute a new belief B′ conditioned on u and ∆pi (Equation 1),
thereby completing the state transition.
cards are of a specific colour often does not indicate whether
they can be safely played or discarded.
A second level of semantics arises from information con-
tained in the actions themselves, i.e., the very fact that an
agent decided to take a particular action and not another,
rather than the information resulting from the state transition
induced by the action. This is essential to the formation of
conventions and to discovering good strategies in Hanabi.
To address these challenges, we propose the Bayesian ac-
tion decoder (BAD), a novel multi-agent RL algorithm for
discovering effective communication protocols and policies
in cooperative, partially observable multi-agent settings. In-
spired by the work of Nayyar et al. (2013), BAD uses all
publicly observable features in the environment to compute
a public belief over the players’ private features. This ef-
fectively defines a new Markov process, the public belief
Markov decision process (PuB-MDP), in which the action
space is the set of deterministic partial policies, parame-
terised by deep neural networks, that can be sampled for a
given public state. By acting in the space of deterministic
partial policies that map from private observations into envi-
ronment actions, an agent acting only on this public belief
state can still learn an optimal policy. Using approximate,
factorised Bayesian updates and deep neural networks, we
show for the first time how a method using the public belief
of Nayyar et al. (2013), can scale to large state spaces and
allow agents to carry out a form of counterfactual reasoning.
When an agent observes the action of another agent, the
public belief is updated by sampling a set of possible private
states from the public belief and filtering for those states in
which the teammate chose the observed action. This process
is closely related to the kind of theory of mind reasoning
that humans routinely undertake (Baker et al., 2017). Such
reasoning seeks to understand why a person took a specific
action among several, and what information this contains
about the distribution over private observations.
We experimentally validate an exact version of BAD on a
simple two-step matrix game, showing that it outperforms
policy gradient methods. We then apply an approximate
version to Hanabi, where BAD achieves an average score of
24.174 points in the two-player setting, surpassing the best
previously published results for learning agents by around
9 points and approaching the best known performance of
24.9 points for (cheating) open-hand gameplay. BAD thus
establishes a current state-of-the-art on the Hanabi Learning
Environment (?) for the two player self-play setting. We
further show that the beliefs obtained via Bayesian reasoning
have 40% less uncertainty over possible hands than those
using only grounded information.
2. Background and Setting
Consider a partially observable multi-agent environment
with A agents. At time t each agent a takes action uat
sampled from policy pia(ua|τat ), where τat is its action-
observation history τat = {oa0 , ua0 , .., oat }. Here oat are the
observations of agent a at time t, which is given by the obser-
vation function O(a, st) in state st. The next Markov state
st+1 of the environment is produced by the transition func-
tion P (st+1|st,ut), which conditions on the joint action
ut = {u1t , .., uAt }, where uat ∈ U . In the fully cooperative
setting considered here, each agent receives a per-timestep
team reward rt+1(st,ut) that depends on the last state and
Bayesian Action Decoder
last joint action. We allow centralised training but require de-
centralised execution, from which follows that the policies
pia are known to all agents. This setting can be formalised
as a Dec-POMDP (Oliehoek, 2012).
The goal of multi-agent RL is to find a set of agent policies
{pia}a=1,...,A that maximise the total expected return per
episode J = Eτ∼P (τ |pia)
[∑
t γ
trt
]
, where γ is the discount
factor. In deep RL, optimisation involves training neural
networks that represent policies and value functions. In par-
tially observable settings, the networks are typically recur-
rent, e.g., LSTMs (Wierstra et al., 2009), as they can learn
to represent a sufficient statistic of the action-observation
history τat in the hidden activations.
Here we consider a setting where the Markov state st con-
sists of a set of discrete features ft, composed of public
features f pubt and private features f
pri
t . The public features
are common knowledge to all agents, while private features
are observable by at least one, but not all, of the agents.
fat are the private features observable by agent a. We use
the notation f prit [i] to indicate the i-th private state feature.
For example, in a typical card game the cards being played
openly on the table are part of f pubt , the cards held by each
player are in f prit , f
a
t contains the cards held by agent a,
and f prit [i] corresponds to a specific card held by a specific
player. We assume that this separation of state features is
common knowledge to all agents. An example of this sep-
aration for the case of an MDP is illustrated in Figure 1a.
Furthermore, while all our formalisms and methods can be
extended to synchronous action settings, for simplicity we
assume a turn-based setting with one agent acting per step.
3. Method
Below we introduce the Bayesian Action Decoder (BAD).
BAD scales the public belief of Nayyar et al. (2013) to
large state spaces using factorised beliefs, an approximate
Bayesian update, and sampled deterministic policies param-
eterised by deep neural networks.
3.1. Public belief
In single-agent partially observable settings, it is clearly
useful for an agent to maintain beliefs about the hidden
environment state, since this is a sufficient statistic for its
action-observation history (Kaelbling et al., 1998). In multi-
agent settings, however, it is not obvious what the beliefs
should be over. It is not enough to maintain beliefs over the
environment state alone, as other agents also have unobserv-
able internal states. In interactive POMDPs (I-POMDPs;
Gmytrasiewicz & Doshi 2005), agents model each other’s
beliefs, beliefs over these beliefs, and so on, but this is often
computationally intractable.
Fortunately, in our setting the common knowledge described
above makes it possible to compute a public belief, (Nay-
yar et al., 2013), that makes the recursion of I-POMDPs
unnecessary. In our case the public belief Bt is the posterior
over all of the private state features given only the public
features, i.e., Bt = P (f prit |f pub≤t ), where ≤ t indicates his-
tory: f pub≤t = (f
pub
0 , .., f
pub
t ). Because Bt conditions only
on publicly available information, it can be computed inde-
pendently by every agent via a common algorithm, yielding
the same result for all agents. Furthermore, since all agents
know f pub, it suffices for Bt to be a posterior over f pri, not
ft = {f pri, f pub}.
While the public belief avoids recursive reasoning, it is not
obvious how it can be used to guide behaviour: agents that
condition their actions only on the public belief will never
exploit their private observations. As Nayyar et al. (2013)
propose, we can construct a special public agent whose
policy piBAD conditions on the public observation and the
public belief but which nonetheless can generate optimal
behaviour.1 This is possible because an action selected by
piBAD specifies a partial policy,
∆
pi : {fa} → U , for the
acting agent, deterministically mapping private observations
to environment actions. The sampling of a deterministic
partial policy also addresses a fundamental tension in using
policy gradients to learn communication protocols, namely,
differentiation and exploration require high-entropy policies,
while communication requires low-entropy policies. By
sampling in the space of deterministic policies, both can be
achieved.
Intuitively, the public agent can be viewed as a third party
that can observe only the public observation and belief.
While piBAD cannot observe the private state, it can tell each
agent what to do for any private observation it might receive.
Thus at each timestep, the public agent selects ∆pi based on Bt
and f pubt ; the acting agent then selects the action u
a
t =
∆
pi(fa)
by supplying the private observation hidden from the public
agent; the public agent then uses the observed action uat to
construct the new belief Bt+1.
3.2. Public Belief MDP
Since ∆pi and uat are public information, observing u
a
t induces
a posterior belief over the possible private state features f prit
given by the public belief update:
P (fat |uat ,Bt, f pubt , ∆pi) =
P (uat |fat , ∆pi)P (fat |Bt, f pubt )
P (uat |Bt, f pubt , ∆pi)
(1)
∝ 1( ∆pi(fat ), uat )P (fat |Bt, f pubt ).
(2)
1piBAD conditions on the public observation because the public
belief is a sufficient statistic for the public observation, but only
over the private features.
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Using this Bayesian belief update, we can define a new
Markov process, the public belief MDP (PuB-MDP), as
illustrated in Figure 1b. The state sBAD = {B, f pub} of
the PuB-MDP consists of the public observation and pub-
lic belief; the action space is the set of deterministic par-
tial policies that map from private observations to envi-
ronment actions; and the transition function is given by
P (s′BAD|sBAD, ∆pi). The next state contains the new public
belief calculated using the public belief update. The reward
function marginalises over the private state features:
rBAD(sBAD,
∆
pi) =
∑
f pri
B(f pri)r(s, ∆pi(f pri)). (3)
Since s′BAD includes the new public belief, and that belief
is computed via an update that conditions on ∆pi, the PuB-
MDP transition function conditions on all of ∆pi, not just the
selected action uat . Thus the state transition depends not just
on the executed action, but on the counterfactual actions:
those specified by ∆pi for private observations other than fat .
In the remainder of this section, we describe how factorised
beliefs and policies can be used to efficiently learn a public
policy piBAD for the PuB-MDP.
3.3. Sampling Deterministic Partial Policies
For each public state, piBAD must select a distribution
piBAD(
∆
pi|sBAD) over deterministic partial policies. The size
of this space is exponential in the number of possible private
observations |fa|, but we can reduce this to a linear depen-
dence by assuming a distribution across ∆pi that factorises
across the different private observations, i.e., for all ∆pi,
piBAD(
∆
pi|Bt, f pub) :=
∏
fa
piBAD(
∆
pi(fa)|Bt, f pub, fa). (4)
With this restriction, we can parameterise piBAD with factors
of the form piθBAD(u
a|Bt, f pub, fa) using a function approx-
imator such as a deep neural network. In order for all of
the agents to perform the public belief update, the sampled
∆
pi must be public. We resolve this by having ∆pi sampled
deterministically from a given Bt and f pubt , using a common
knowledge random seed ξt. The seeds are shared prior to
the game so that all agents sample the same ∆pi. This re-
sembles the way humans share common ways of reasoning
in card games and allows the agents to explore alternative
policies jointly as a team. Further details on the mechanics
of parameterising and sampling from piBAD are provided in
the Supplemental Material.
3.4. Factorised Belief Updates.
In general, representing exact beliefs is intractable in all
but the smallest state spaces. For example, in card games
the number of possible hands is typically exponential in
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Figure 2: Payoffs for the toy matrix-like game. The two
outer dimensions correspond to the card held by each player,
the two inner dimensions to the action chosen by each player.
Payouts are structured such that Player 1 must encode in-
formation about their card in the action they chose in order
to obtain maximum payoffs. Although presented here in
matrix form for compactness, this is a two-step, turn-based
game, with Player 1 always taking the first action and Player
2 taking an action after observing Player 1’s action.
the number of cards held by all players. To avoid this un-
favourable scaling, we can instead represent an approximate
factorised belief state
P (f prit |f pub≤t ) ≈
∏
i
P (f prit [i]|f pub≤t ) =: Bfactt . (5)
From here on we drop the superscript and use B exclu-
sively to refer to the factorised belief. In a card game each
factor represents per-card probability distributions, assum-
ing approximate independence across the different cards
both within a hand and across players. This approximation
makes it possible to represent and reason over the otherwise
intractably large state spaces that commonly occur in many
settings, including card games.
To carry out the public belief update with a factorised repre-
sentation we maintain factorised likelihood terms Lt[f [i]]
for each private feature that we update recursively:
Lt[f [i]] := P (ua≤t|f [i],B≤t, f pub≤t , ∆pi≤t) (6)
≈ Lt−1[f [i]] · P (uat |f [i],Bt, f pubt , ∆pit) (7)
= Lt−1[f [i]] ·
Eft∼Bt
[
1(ft[i], f [i])1(
∆
pi(fat ), u
a
t )
]
Eft∼Bt
[
1(ft[i], f [i])
] ,
(8)
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where (7) assumes that actions are (approximately) condi-
tionally independent of the future given the past. As indi-
cated, these likelihood terms are calculated by sampling,
and the more samples the better.
3.5. Self-Consistent Beliefs
This factorisation is only an approximation, even in simple
card games: knowledge that a player is holding a specific
card clearly influences the probability that another player
is holding that same card. Furthermore, our approximation
can yield beliefs that are not even self-consistent, i.e., they
are not the marginalisation of any belief over joint features.
While not central to the key ideas behind BAD, we introduce
a general iterative procedure that can account for feature
interactions in factorised models. Starting with a public
belief B0 = Bt we can iteratively update the belief to make
it more self-consistent through re-marginalisation:
Bk+1(f [i]) =
∑
f [−i]
Bk(f [−i])P (f [i]|f [−i], f pub≤t , ua≤t, ∆pi≤t)
(9)
∝ Ef [−i]∼Bk
[Lt(f [i])P (f [i]|f [−i], f pubt )],
(10)
where f [−i] denotes all features excluding f [i]. In the last
step we used the factorised likelihoods from above to con-
vert to an expectation, so that we can use samples to ap-
proximate the intractable sum across features. The notion
of refining the distribution over one feature while keeping
the distribution across all other features fixed is similar to
Expectation Propagation for factor graphs (Minka, 2001).
However, the card counts constitute a global factor, making
the factor graph formulation less useful. While this iterative
update can in principle be carried out until convergence, in
practice we terminate after a fixed number of iterations.
4. Experiments and Results
4.1. Matrix Game
We first present proof-of-principle results for a two-player,
two-step partially observable matrix-like game (Figure 2).
The state consists of 2 random bits (the cards for Player 1
and 2) and the action space consists of 3 discrete actions.
Each player observes its own card, with Player 2 also ob-
serving Player 1’s action before acting, which in princi-
ple allows Player 1 to encode information about its card
with its action. The reward is specified by a payoff tensor,
r = Payoff[card1][card2][u1][u2], where carda and ua are
the card and action of the two players, respectively. The
payout tensor is structured such that the optimal reward can
only be achieved if the two players establish a convention,
in particular if Player 1 chooses informative actions that can
be decoded by Player 2.
Figure 3: BAD, both with and without counterfactual (CF)
gradients, outperforms vanilla policy gradient on the matrix-
like game. Each line is the mean over 1000 games, and the
shade indicates the standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).
As shown in Figure 3, BAD clearly outperforms the base-
line policy-gradient method on the toy matrix game. In this
small, exact setting, it is also possible to estimate counterfac-
tual (CF) policy gradients that reinforce not only the action
taken, but also these counterfactual actions. This can be
achieved by replacing log pia(uat |τa) with logP ( ∆pi|Bt, f pub)
in the estimation of the policy gradient. However, the addi-
tional improvement in performance from using CF gradients
is minor compared to the initial performance gain from us-
ing a counterfactual belief state.
Code for the matrix game with a proof-of-principle im-
plementation of BAD is available at https://bit.ly/
2P3YOyd.
4.2. Hanabi
Here we briefly describe the rules of 2-player Hanabi.
There are 5 cards in a hand. For each of the 5 colours there
are three 1s, one 5, and two each of all other ranks, i.e., 10
cards per colour for a total of 50 = 5× 10 cards in the deck.
While this is a modestly large number of cards, even for
2 players it leads to 6.2× 1013 possible joint hands at the
beginning of the game.
4.3. Observations and Actions
Each player observes the hands of all other players, but
not their own. The action space consists of 2 × 5 options
for discarding and playing cards, and 5 + 5 options per
teammate for hinting colours and ranks. Hints reveal all
cards of a specific rank or colour to one of the teammates,
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e.g., ‘Player 2’s card 3 and 5 are red’. Hinting for colours
and ranks not present in the hand of the teammate (so-called
‘empty hints’) is not allowed.
Each hint costs one hint token. The game starts with 8
hint tokens, which can be recovered by discarding cards.
After a player has played or discarded a card, she draws a
new card from the deck. When a player picks up the last
card, everyone (including that player) takes one more action
before the game terminates. Legal gameplay consists of
building 5 fireworks, which are piles of ascending numbers,
starting at 1, for each colour. When the 5 has been added to
a pile the firework is complete and the team obtains another
hint token (unless they already have 8). A life token is lost
each time a player plays an illegal card; after three mistakes
the game terminates. Players receive 1 point after playing
any playable card, with a perfect score being 25 = 5× 5.
The number of hint and life tokens at any time are observed
by all players, as are the played and discarded cards, the last
action of the acting player and any hints provided.
4.4. Beliefs in Hanabi
The basic belief calculation in Hanabi is straightforward:
f pubt consists of a vector of ‘candidates’C containing counts
for all remaining cards, and a ‘hint mask’ HM, an ANh ×
(NcolorNrank + 1) binary matrix that is 1 if in a given ‘slot’
the player could be holding a specific card according to the
hints so far, and 0 otherwise; the additional 1 accounts for
the possibility that the card may not exist in the final round
of play. Slots correspond to the features of the private state
space f [i], for example the 3rd card of the second player.
Hints contain both positive and negative information: for
example, the statement ‘the 2nd and 4th cards are red’ also
implies that all other cards are not red.
The basic belief B0 can be calculated as
B0(f [i]) = P (f [i]|f pub) ∝ C(f)× HM(f [i]). (11)
We call this the ‘V0 belief’, in which the belief for each
card depends only on publicly available information for that
card. In our experiments, we focus on baseline agents that
receive this basic belief, rather than the raw hints, as public
observation inputs; while the problem of simply remember-
ing all hints and their most immediate implication for card
counts is potentially challenging for humans in recreational
play, we are here more interested in the problem of forming
effective conventions for high-level play.
As noted above, this basic belief misses an important inter-
action between the hints for different slots. We can calculate
an approximate version of the self-consistent beliefs that
avoids the potentially expensive and noisy sampling step
in Equation 10 (note that this sampling is distinct from the
sampling required to compute the marginal likelihood in
Equation 8). As derived in the Supplemental Material,
Bk+1(f [i]) ∝
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
Bk(f [j])
)
×HM(f [i]). (12)
We call the resulting belief at convergence (or after a max-
imum number of iterations) the ‘V1 belief‘. It does not
condition on the Bayesian probabilities but considers inter-
actions between hints for different cards. In essence, at each
iteration the belief for a given slot is updated by reducing
the candidate count by the number of cards believed to be
held across all other slots.
By running the same algorithm but including L, we obtain
the Bayesian beliefs BB that lie at the core of BAD:
BB0(f [i]) ∝ C(f)× HM(f [i])× L(f [i]), (13)
BBk+1(f [i]) ∝
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
Bk(f [j])
)
× HM(f [i])× L(f [i]). (14)
In practice, to ensure stability, the final ‘V2 belief’ that we
use is an interpolation between the Bayesian belief and the
V1 belief: V2 = (1 − α)BB + αV1 with α = 0.01 (we
found α = 0.1 to also work). For the Bayesian update we
sampled S = 3, 000 hands during training and S = 20, 000
hands for the final test games.
4.5. Architecture Details for Baselines and Method
Advantage actor-critic agents were trained using the
Importance-Weighted Actor-Learner Architecture (Espeholt
et al., 2018), in particular the multi-agent implementation
described in Jaderberg et al. (2018). In this framework,
‘actors’ continually generate trajectories of experience (se-
quences of states, actions, and rewards) by having agents
(self-)playing the game, which are then used by ‘learners’ to
perform batched gradient updates (batch size was 32 for all
agents). Because the policy used to generate the trajectory
can be several gradient updates behind the policy at the time
of the gradient update, V-trace was applied to correct for
the off-policy trajectories. The length of the trajectories, or
rollouts, was 65, the maximum length of a winning game.
Further details for the hyperparameters, architecture, and
training are given in the Supplemental Material.
4.6. Results on Hanabi
The BAD agent achieves a new state-of-the-art mean per-
formance of 24.174 points on two-player Hanabi. In Fig-
ure 4a we show training curves and test performance for
BAD and two LSTM-based baseline methods, as well as the
performance of FireFlower (https://github.com/
lightvector/fireflower), the best known hand-
coded bot for two-player Hanabi. For the LSTM agents,
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Figure 4: a) Hanabi training curves for BAD and the V0 and V1 baseline methods using LSTMs rather than the Bayesian
belief. Thick lines indicate the final evaluated agent for each agent type, with the dots showing the final test score. Error
bars (standard error of the mean, s.e.m.) are smaller than the dots. Upward kinks in the curves are generally due to agents
‘evolving’ in PBT by copying its weights and hyperparameters (plus perturbations) from a superior agent. b) Distribution of
game scores for BAD on Hanabi under testing conditions. BAD achieves a perfect score in almost 60% of the games. The
dashed line shows the proportion of perfect games reported for FireFlower, the best known hard-coded bot for two-player
Hanabi. c) Per-card cross entropy with the true hand for different belief mechanisms during BAD play. V0 is the basic belief
based on hints and card counts, V1 is the self-consistent belief, and V2 is the BAD belief which also includes the Bayesian
update. The BAD agent conveys around 40% of the information via conventions, rather than grounded information.
test performance was obtained by using the greedy version
of the trained policy, resulting in slightly higher scores than
during training. To select the agent, we first performed a
sweep over all agents for 10,000 games, then carried out a
final test run of 100,000 games on the best agent from the
sweep to obtain an unbiased score. For the BAD agent we
also increased the number of sampled hands. The results for
other learning methods from the literature perform below
the range of the y-axis (far below 20 points) and are omitted
for readability. We note that, under a strict interpretation of
the rules of Hanabi, games in which all three error tokens
are exhausted should be awarded a score of 0. Under these
rules the same BAD agent achieves 23.917± 0.009 s.e.m,
the best known score, even though it was not trained under
these conditions. SmartBot and FireFlower achieve average
scores of 22.99 and 22.56 respectively.
While not all of the game play BAD learns is easy to follow,
some conventions can be understood simply from inspecting
the game. Printouts of 100 random games can be found at
https://bit.ly/2zeEShh. One convention stands
out: Hinting for ‘red’ or ‘yellow’ indicates that the newest
card of the other player is playable. We found that in over
80% of cases when an agent hints ‘red’ or ‘yellow’, the next
action of the other agent is to play the newest card. This
convention is very powerful: Typically agents know the
least about the newest card, so by hinting ‘red’ or ‘yellow’,
agents can use a single hint to tell the other agent that the
card is playable. Indeed, the use of two colours to indicate
Agent Learning steps Mean ± s.e.m. Prop. perfect
SmartBot - 23.09 29.52%
FireFlower - 23.37 ± 0.0002 52.6%
V0-LSTM 20.2B 23.622 ± 0.005 36.5%
V1-LSTM 21.1B 23.919 ± 0.004 47.5%
BAD 16.3B 24.174± 0.004 58.6%
Table 1: Test scores on 100K games. The LSTM agents
were tested with a greedy version of the trained policy, while
the final BAD agent was evaluated with V1 mix-in α = 0.01,
20K sampled hands, and inverse softmax temperature 100.0.
The FireFlower bot was evaluated over 25K games.
‘play newest card’ was present all of the highest-performing
agents we studied. Hinting ‘white’ and ‘blue’ are followed
by a discard of the newest card in over 25% of cases. We
also found that the agent sometimes attempts to play cards
which are not playable in order to convey information to
their team mate. In general, unlike human players, agents
play and discard predominantly from the last card. In the
supplementary material we also include a written analysis
of our bot by the creator of FireFlower.
Figure 4c shows the quality of the different beliefs. While
the iterated belief update leads to a reduction in cross en-
tropy compared to the basic belief, a much greater reduction
in cross entropy is obtained using counterfactual beliefs.
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This clearly demonstrates the importance of learning con-
ventions for successful gameplay in Hanabi: Roughly 40%
of the information is obtained through conventions rather
than through the grounded information and card counting.
5. Related Work
5.1. Learning to Communicate
Many works have addressed problem settings where agents
must learn to communicate in order to cooperatively solve
a toy problem. These tasks typically involve a cheap-talk
communication channel that can be modeled as a continu-
ous variable during training, which allows differentiation
through the channel as first proposed by Foerster et al.
(2016a) and Sukhbaatar et al. (2016). In this work we fo-
cused on the case where agents must learn to communicate
via grounded hinting actions and observable environment
actions rather than a cheap-talk channel. This is closest to
the “hat game” of Foerster et al. (2016b), who proposed a
simple extension to recurrent deep Q-networks rather than
explicitly modeling action-conditioned Bayesian beliefs. An
idea similar to the Pub-MDP was introduced in the context
of decentralised stochastic control by Nayyar et al. (2013),
who also formulated a coordinator that uses “common in-
formation” to map local controller information to actions.
However, they did not provide a concrete solution method
that can scale to a high-dimensional problem like Hanabi.
5.2. Hanabi
A number of papers have been published on Hanabi. Baffier
et al. (2016) showed that optimal gameplay in Hanabi is
NP-hard even when players can observe their own cards.
Encoding schemes similar to the hat game essentially solve
the five-player case (Cox et al., 2015), but only achieve
17.8 points in the two-player setting (Bouzy, 2017). Walton-
Rivers et al. (2017) developed a variety of Monte Carlo tree
search and rule-based methods for Hanabi, but the reported
scores were roughly 50% lower than BAD. Osawa (2015)
defined a number of heuristics for the two-player case that
reason over possible hands given the other player’s action.
While this is similar in spirit to our approach, the work was
limited to hand-coded heuristics, and the reported scores
were around 8 points lower than BAD. Eger et al. (2017)
investigated humans playing with hand-coded agents, but no
pairing resulted in scores higher than 15 points on average.
The best result for two-player Hanabi we could find
was for the FireFlower described at github.com/
lightvector/fireflower, which has been reported
to achieve an average of 23.37 points (52.6% perfect games).
While FireFlower uses the same game rules as those used in
our work, it is entirely hand-coded and involves no learning.
5.3. Belief State Methods
The continual re-solving (nested solving) algorithm used by
DeepStack (Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017) and Libratus (Brown &
Sandholm, 2018) for poker also use a belief state space. Like
BAD, when making a decision in a player state, continual re-
solving considers the belief state associated with the current
player and generates a joint policy across all player states
consistent with this belief. The policy for the actual player
is then selected from this joint policy. Continual re-solving
also does a Bayesian update of the beliefs after an action.
There are key differences, however. Continual re-solving
performa exact belief updates, which requires a joint policy
space small enough to enumerate; belief states are also
augmented with opponent values; continual re-solving is
a value-based method, where the training process consists
of learning the values of belief states under optimal play;
finally, the algorithm is designed for two-player, zero-sum
games, where it can independently consider player state
values while guaranteeing that an optimal choice for the
joint action policy can be found.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We presented the Bayesian action decoder (BAD), a novel
algorithm for multi-agent reinforcement learning in cooper-
ative partially observable settings. BAD uses a factorised,
approximate belief state that allows agents to efficiently
learn informative actions, leading to the discovery of con-
ventions. We showed that BAD outperforms policy gradi-
ents in a proof-of-principle matrix game, and achieves a
state-of-the-art performance of 24.174 points on average
in the card game Hanabi. We also showed that using the
Bayesian update leads to a reduction in uncertainty across
the private hands in Hanabi by around 40%. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first instance in which deep RL
has been successfully applied to a problem setting that both
requires the discovery of communication protocols and was
originally designed to be challenging for humans. BAD also
illustrates clearly that using an explicit belief computation
achieves better performance in such settings than current
state-of-the-art RL methods using implicit beliefs, such as
recurrent neural networks.
In the future, we aim to apply BAD to games with more
players and further generalise BAD by learning more of its
components, e.g., the V0-belief. While the belief update
necessarily involves a sampling step, most of the other com-
ponents can likely be learned end-to-end. We also plan to
extend the BAD mechanism to value-based methods and
further investigate the relevance of counterfactual gradients.
Similar to what was suggested as next steps in (?), we hope
to extend the setting to a point where our bots can learn to
collaborate with human players.
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A. Parameterising and Sampling from the
Distribution over Partial Policies
BAD requires us to parameterise a probability distribution
over partial policies using a deep neural network:
P (
∆
pi|sBAD) = piθBAD( ∆pi|sBAD). (15)
The first insight is that we can trivially use a neural network
to map from public states, sBAD, into probabilistic partial
policies. To do so, we simply start with a feedforward
policy that takes as input both sBAD and fa and produces a
distributions over actions:
piθ(sBAD, f
a)→ P (u|sBAD, fa). (16)
Next, we note that if we fix a given sBAD, we now have a
probabilistic partial policy which maps each private obser-
vation fa into a probability distribution over actions. This
partial policy is produced deterministically as a function of
sBAD via the parameters θ:
pi(u|fa) : {fa} → {P (U)} |sBAD, (17)
pi(u|fa) = piθ(u|sBAD, fa). (18)
Now, this is close, but not quite what we want. Above we
have a deterministic map from sBAD into probabilistic par-
tial policies, pi(u|fa). Instead, we require a differentiable
distribution over deterministic partial policies.
Perhaps surprisingly, this can be accomplished by condition-
ing the sampling from pi(u|fa) on a common knowledge
random seed, ξ:
∆
pi : {fa} → U |sBAD, (19)
{fa} → u ∼ pi(u|fa) |ξ, (20)
{fa} → u ∼ piθ(u|sBAD, fa) |ξ. (21)
(22)
Thus, when we sample ξ we are effectively sampling an
entire deterministic partial policy.
B. Hyperparameters and Training Details
For the toy matrix game, we used a batch size of 32 and the
Adam optimiser with all default TensorFlow settings; we
did not tune hyperparameters for any runs.
In the V0-LSTM and V1-LSTM BAD agents, all observa-
tions were first processed by an MLP with a single 256-unit
hidden layer and ReLU activations, then fed into a 2-layer
LSTM with 256 units in each layer. The policy pi was a
softmax readout of the LSTM output. The baseline network
was an MLP with a single 256-unit hidden layer and ReLU
activations, which then projected linearly to a single value.
Since the baseline network is only used to compute gradient
updates, we followed ? (?) in feeding each agent’s own
hand (i.e., the other agent’s private observation) into the
baseline by concatenating it with the LSTM output; thus we
make the common assumption of centralised training and
decentralised execution. We note that the V0 and V1-LSTM
agents differed only in their public belief inputs.
The Hanabi BAD agent consisted of an MLP with two 384-
unit hidden layers and ReLU activations that processed all
observations, followed by a linear softmax policy readout.
To compute the baseline, we used the same MLP as the
policy but included the agent’s own hand in the input (this
input was present but zeroed out for the computation of the
policy).
For all agents, illegal actions (such as hint for a red card
when there are no red cards) were masked out by setting the
corresponding policy logits to a large negative value before
sampling an action. In particular, for the non-acting agent at
each turn the only allowed action was the ‘no-action’. For
Hanabi, we used the RMSProp optimiser with  = 10−10,
momentum 0, and decay 0.99. The RL discounting factor γ
was set to 0.999. The baseline loss was multiplied by 0.25
and added to the policy-gradient loss. We used population-
based training (PBT) (?Jaderberg et al., 2018) to ‘evolve’ the
learning rate and entropy regularisation parameter during the
course of training, with each training run consisting of a pop-
ulation of 30 agents. For the LSTM agents, learning rates
were sampled log-uniformly from the interval [1, 4)× 10−4
while the entropy regularisation parameter was sampled log-
uniformly from the interval [1, 5) × 10−2. For the BAD
agents, learning rates were sampled log-uniformly from the
interval [9× 10−5, 3× 10−4) while the entropy regularisa-
tion parameter was sampled log-uniformly from the interval
[3, 7)×10−2. Agents evolved within the PBT framework by
copying weights and hyperparameters (plus perturbations)
according to each agent’s rating, which was an exponen-
tially moving average of the episode rewards with factor
0.01. An agent was considered for copying roughly every
200M steps if a randomly chosen copy-to agent had a rating
at least 0.5 points higher. To allow the best hyperparameters
to manifest sufficiently, PBT was turned off for the first 1B
steps of training.
The BAD agent was trained with 100 self-consistent iter-
ations, a V1 mix-in of α = 0.01, BAD discount factor
γBAD = 1, inverse temperature 1.0, and 3000 sampled hands.
Since sampling from card-factorised beliefs can result in
hands that are not compatible with the deck, we sampled 5
times the number of hands and accepted the first 3000 legal
hands, zeroing out any hands that were illegal.
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C. Self-Consistent Belief Approximation for
Hanabi
We will use the same notation as in the main text: f pubt
consists of a vector of ‘candidates’ C containing counts
for all remaining cards, and a ‘hint mask’ HM, an ANh ×
NcolorNrank binary matrix that is 1 if in a given ‘slot’ the
player could be holding a specific card according to the
hints given so far, and 0 otherwise”. Furthermore, L(f [i]),
is the marginal likelyhood.
Then the basic per-card belief is simply:
B0(f [i]) ∝ C(f)× HM(f [i])× L(f [i]), (23)
B0(f [i]) =
C(f)× HM(f [i])× L(f [i])∑
g C(g)× HM(g[i])× L(g[i])
(24)
= βi
(
C(f)× HM(f [i])× L(f [i])). (25)
In the last two lines we are normalising the probability, since
the probability of the i-th feature being one of the possible
values must sum to 1. For convenience we also introduced
the notation βi for the normalisation factor.
Next we apply the same logic to the iterative belief update.
The key insight here is to note that conditioning on the
features f [−i], i.e., the other cards in the slots, corresponds
to reducing the card counts in the candidates. Below we use
M(f [i]) = HM(f [i])×L(f [i]) for notational convenience:
Bk+1(f [i])
=
∑
f [−i]
Bk(f [−i])P (f [i]|f [−i], f pub≤t , ua≤t, ∆pi≤t) (26)
=
∑
g[−i]
Bk(g[−i])βi
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
1(g[j] = f)
)
M(f [i]).
(27)
In the last line we relabelled the dummy index f [−i] to g[−i]
for clarity and used the result from above. Next we sub-
stitute the factorised belief assumption across the features,
Bk(g[−i]) = ∏j 6=i Bk(g[j]) :
Bk+1(f [i])
=
∑
g[−i]
Bk(g[−i])βi
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
1(g[j] = f)
)
M(f [i])
(28)
=
∑
g[−i]
∏
j 6=i
Bk(g[j])βi
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
1(g[j] = f)
)
M(f [i])
(29)
' βi
∑
g[−i]
∏
j 6=i
Bk(g[j])
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
1(g[j] = f)
)
M(f [i]).
(30)
In the last line we have ommited the dependency of βi on
the sampled hands f [−i]. It corresponds to calculating the
average across sampled hands first and then normalising
(which is approximate but tractable) rather than normalising
and then averaging (which is exact but intractable). We can
now use product-sum rules to simplify the expression.
Bk+1(f [i])
' βi
(
C(f)−
∑
g[−i]
∏
j 6=i
Bk(g[j])
∑
j 6=i
1(g[j] = f)
)
M(f [i])
(31)
= βi
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
∑
g
Bk(g[j])1(g[j] = f)
)
M(f [i])
(32)
= βi
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
Bk(f [j])
)
M(f [i]) (33)
∝
(
C(f)−
∑
j 6=i
Bk(f [j])
)
M(f [i]). (34)
This concludes the proof.
D. Anecdotal Analysis
Below we present commentary from David Wu (https:
//github.com/lightvector/), the creator of the
FireFlower bot, on our BAD agent. While this is anecdotal
evidence, we believe it provides some interesting insights
into the gameplay that our BAD agent discovers. The com-
ments are taking verbatim from an email exchange with
David:
D.1. Communicating Playables
• As you observed before, the bot uses R and Y often to
hint newest-card-playability.
• In addition to the R and Y hints, it also often uses direct
hints to the newest card to indicate playability, in the
way that natural human conventions do, and I think
these include both color and number hints.
• When the R and Y hints or direct hints to the newest
card hit multiple cards, the bot often was indicating
multiple plays. In the small sample size of cases we
looked over, it tended to be the case that the R/Y hints
were more often “play in the order from newest to
oldest” while the direct hints were more often in the
order of “play from oldest to newest”. I think this
was not 100% consistent though, but in all cases when
looking at the direct beliefs, it was clear that in each
case there was a strong ordering convention was in
force for that hint, it’s just that we didn’t see enough
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cases to be able to determine the precise rules for which
one when. Generally though, it makes a lot of sense to
vary the ordering convention in different parts of the
hint space to add flexibility in hinting.
• The bot uses certain other kinds of direct hints to older
cards to suggest that those cards are one step away
from playable, or something of that nature. Sometimes
the belief state shows that this is not absolutely certain,
but over time as other things happen the probability
mass sometimes gradually updates and concentrates
on the card on the truth, such that once the preceding
card is played, the bot may then play the formerly-one-
step-away card without any further suggestion.
• For these “delayed” one-step-removed hints to older
cards, there is also a similar variation in ordering con-
ventions in the case those hints hit more than one
card, sometimes they’re in “age-order” and sometimes
they’re in “reverse-age-order”.
• Commonly the R and Y hints also indicate other plays
or delayed plays besides the play of the newest card.
The bot chooses the manner of hinting the first card as
playable (R vs Y vs direct hint) to try to communicate
other useful information at the same time, if possible.
• I think occasionally the bot seems to “single out” a card
by directly hinting all other cards in the hand *besides*
that card over successive turns, and sometimes this
implies that the singled-out unhinted card is playable.
I’m not sure on this one though, I’d need to see more
cases.
• I think there seems to be some interesting other con-
ventions that seem to function to give information to
allow play of older red and yellow cards, which are
necessary since direct hints of R and Y mean to play
the newest card rather than the card hinted.
D.2. Communicating Protection
• As you observed before, the bot discards its newest
card by default.
• G hints that do not directly hit the first card appear
to mean that the newest card is dangerous and should
not be discarded. Possibly it is more specific, and
actually just means that it’s a 5, the examples I recall
all involved 5s. The bot also can just directly hint the
newest card in various ways.
• The bot is very aggressive about protecting the newest
card if the newest card is a 5 or otherwise dangerous
(the last copy in the deck), whether by giving a G hint,
or a direct hint, or otherwise. This is so consistent
that pretty much any action other than an immediate
protection causes the other bot to infer that the newest
card is NOT a 5 or the last copy of a card whose first
copy has been lost.
• However, the bot does *not* do this any longer if there
is a common-knowledge-extremely-safe discard in that
player’s hand (e.g. a redundant copy of a card already
played). In that case, it is understood that the bot will
prefer to discard that instead. Then, protection of the
newest card is not necessarily urgent any more, and
neither will a player necessarily infer that the newest
card is safe from a failure by their partner to protect it
immediately.
• There seems to be some interesting dictionary of hints
that we haven’t worked out yet about ways to signal
to discard cards besides the newest, which prevents
junk from accumulating in the hand as non-playable
but useful-to-hold-on-to cards enter the hand.
Miscellaneous Communication
• Often the hints, and sometimes its other actions just
come “attached” with miscellaneous information. The
most extreme example is I observed one game where
as a result of the bots discarding, it was immediately
implied that a particular card in the other player’s hand
was almost certainly red. This information was not
immediately useful (the red card was not yet playable,
nor was it likely to have been discarded soon), it was
simply just extra information attached to the action of
discarding in that particular case. Presumably the bot
was by convention constrained to almost certainly do
some other action in that situation had that partner’s
card counterfactually not been red.
• This kind of extra not-immediately-useful “attached”
information is perhaps the most non-human part of the
bot’s convention set. But actually it doesn’t happen as
often as one might expect from a “nonhuman” agent.
For the most part I didn’t see this all that much for
plays and discards (that one extreme example notwith-
standing). This makes sense, as having too many such
conventions would overly constrain the ability of the
players to act, as discard/play are both critical actions
you need to take very frequently regardless of the other
player’s hand.
• Even for hint actions, most hints were very sensible
and humanly explainable, or clearly appeared that they
would be humanly explainable had we had a larger
sample size so that we could be surer about the general-
ity of its meaning and exactly how the bot had packed
different meanings into the hint space. There were only
a few hint actions that I found particularly “weird” in
what inference was made.
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• A priori, there’s no particular reason why a bot’s con-
ventions couldn’t, for example, completely change
depending on the turn number modulo 3, and be ex-
tremely hard for humans to comprehend. But for the
most part, the conventions of this bot weren’t like that
- they were pretty understandable, or at least seemed
consistent and sensible even if we didn’t have all the
exact meanings mapped out.
Overall Quality of Play and Game Flow
• The bot is *very* strong in the early game, and there
its convention set is overall far more efficient than “nat-
ural” human convention sets (although not-necessarily
human convention sets that were constructed to be
more artificial and encoding-like). It’s really quite
beautiful.
• The bot is superhumanish at tracking inferred informa-
tion over time, e.g. on the one hand inferring that a
card is not scary in first position, then as it drifts back
later in the hand, inferring this or that other property
incidentally, and inferring based on the ”aging” of the
card that it is probably not this or that, and so on, until
only a couple possibilities remain. It’s not uncommon
that in the midgame, both players know almost all the
relevant things about their hands.
• The bot might be tactically weak in occasional situa-
tions on or near 0 hints, where the ensuing sequence of
actions is heavily constrained. It seems to have a very
strong preference to discard and get away from 0 hints,
even when as far as we can tell based on its convention
set it should be possible to just stay at 0 hints and play
out some cards, and where discarding at that moment
is suboptimal. For example if the ensuing sequence
of plays would result in a few 5s being played thereby
recovering some hints for free, and the partner’s im-
mediate discard is also completely safe in the event
that the partner wants to discard, whereas one’s own
discard unnecessarily loses a copy of a card that could
be useful in the future. (If I read the paper right, there
is no explicit lookahead in this bot?).
• The bot makes a few seemingly-clear mistakes in the
endgame (as far as we can tell), although only slight
ones. For example, one of the games we looked at:
– The players were in a close-to-winning state - they
both knew all the playable cards in their hands or
had inferred them with high confidence, and all
they needed to do was play those cards and wait
to draw the few remaining cards to play.
– They had plenty enough hints and headroom
to theoretically execute essentially-perfect play
thereafter (i.e. getting plays out in a timely man-
ner, collectively never discarding any card that
could be useful thereafter, optimizing who draws
the next card for parity, etc), and by my under-
standing of their conventions, nothing stopping
them from doing so.
– But instead of playing, the bot wasted a turn giv-
ing their partner a hint. When you inspected the
V2 belief state, it gave no useful information - the
dominant effect of the hint was actually to con-
centrate probability mass *away* from the truth
giving the partner a misleading belief about a card,
and had almost no other effects.
– Their partner then proceeded to also not play and
instead discarded their newest card, which unnec-
essarily lost one of the copies of a useful 4. There
was a copy of the 4 left in the deck, but such a dis-
card is still bad. If the remaining copy of that card
is the very bottom card of the deck, it guarantees
that you cannot get 25 points, so every unneces-
sary discard of the first copy of any card loses you
EV due to the chance for the other copy to be the
last card.
Speculating a little here - perhaps something about the bot’s
policy or convention set hasn’t converged as sharply in the
endgame? It’s certainly the case that the gradient there is
much smaller - even a clear mistake near the end tends to
cost you only a little in EV if you’re measuring by score,
whereas near the start of the game it can cost you a lot.
And the expected penalty for discarding the first copy of a
useful 4 when otherwise well ahead is slight, since it then
usually only harms you when that 4 is precisely the last card
in the deck which only happens 1/N times, so one might
imagine the average gradient there for good behavior to be
very small.
